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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the purported authority 
of police officers to engage in warrantless examinations of the digital 
information contained in smartphones carried by arrestees.1  The issue 
arose because Supreme Court precedents approved certain searches 
incident to a lawful arrest to protect the safety of the officer and prevent 
the destruction of evidence.2  In the smartphone case, Riley v. California,3 
the Court unanimously declared that such warrantless searches are not 
permitted.4  The majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts 
emphasized that “[c]ellphones differ in both a quantitative and 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s 
 
 *  Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University.  A.B., Harvard University, 
1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., 
University of Connecticut, 1988. 
1.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
2.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile after the arrest of a driver); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of the 
area around an arrestee inside a home). 
3.  134 S. Ct. 2473. 
4.  Id. at 2495. 
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person”5 because of the detailed personal information that such 
smartphones contain.6 
In her commentary for the New York Times about the Court’s 
decision, Linda Greenhouse concluded that Justices’ own personal 
experiences and understanding of the nature of private information 
contained in smartphones led to support for the decision,7 even among 
Justices who typically side with law enforcement’s arguments in Fourth 
Amendment cases.8  In Greenhouse’s words, “The justices are walking in 
their own shoes.  The ringing cellphone could be theirs—or ours.”9  She 
reached a similar conclusion about the role of Justices’ personal 
knowledge in guiding decisions10 with respect to Bond v. United States.11  
In Bond, the majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who 
typically supported law enforcement interests in criminal procedure 
cases,12 invalidated a warrantless external manipulation of a duffel bag in 
the overhead luggage rack of a bus and thereby excluded from use in 
evidence the illegal drugs found in the duffel bag.13  According to 
Greenhouse: 
I remember puzzling over that decision.  In one opinion after 
another, most written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme 
Court had been allowing the police to write their own ticket when 
it came to detecting drug trafficking.  Why draw the line at a duffel 
bag on a Greyhound bus? 
 
5.  Id. at 2478. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Justices Have Cellphones, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 




8.  According to the Supreme Court Judicial Database, for example, Justice Alito 
supported law enforcement interests over individuals’ claims in more than 82% of criminal 
procedure cases decided by the Court prior to the 2009 Term.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
supported law enforcement interests in more than 79% of such cases.  Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia showed similar levels of support by supporting individuals’ 
claims in barely more than one-quarter of criminal procedure decisions in the same time period.  
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATE, DECISIONS & 
DEVELOPMENTS 561–63 (5th ed. 2012). 
9.  Greenhouse, supra note 7, at A27. 
10.  Id.  
11.  529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
12.  Chief Justice Rehnquist supported law enforcement interests in 83% of criminal 
procedure cases.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 562. 
13.  Bond, 529 U.S. at 336–39. 
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Eventually, it occurred to me: The justices were passengers, 
too.  Not on buses, for sure, but on Amtrak or the shuttle [flights 
between New York City and Washington, D.C.], and the notion 
that anyone with a badge could start randomly feeling up their 
carry-ons was deeply distasteful.14 
Greenhouse’s speculative conclusion that life experience can 
influence Supreme Court Justices’ opinions is supported by recent social 
science research.15  Using sophisticated quantitative methods in 
examining more than 200 federal appellate judges’ decisions over a six-
year period, researchers found that “across cases involving gender issues, 
judges who parent daughters as opposed to sons are likely to reach liberal 
decisions—possibly because having daughters causes judges to learn 
about women’s issues.”16  The effect is not driven by Democratic and 
liberal judges’ oft-noted higher levels of support for equality and civil 
rights17 because “[t]he effect . . . is most pronounced among male judges 
appointed by Republican presidents, like [the late] Chief Justice 
[William] Rehnquist.”18  As one of the authors of the study observed: 
“Justices and judges aren’t machines . . . .  They are human, 
just like you and me.  And just like you and me, they have personal 
experiences that affect how they view the world. 
“Having daughters . . . is just one kind of personal experience, 
but there could be other things—for example, serving in the 
military, adopting a child or seeing a law clerk come out as gay.  
All of these things could affect a Justice’s worldview.”19 
The foregoing examples highlight the relevance of experience-based 
knowledge for Supreme Court Justices.  This is not to say that Justices 
 
14.  Greenhouse, supra note 7, at A27. 
15.  Adam N. Glynn and Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters 
Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 52 (2015). 
16.  Id.  
17.  See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 104 
(1999); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 245–55 (1993); Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and Change in the 
Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 137 
(1990). 
18.  Adam Liptak, Another Factor Said to Sway Judges to Rule for Women’s Rights: A 




19.  Id. 
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should or do rely solely on their subjective perceptions of the lessons of 
personal experience20 in guiding their judicial decisions.21  Although other 
factors such as adherence to precedent, Justices’ values, and theories of 
constitutional interpretation also affect judicial decision making,22 the 
strength and role of these influences vary by Justice and by the particular 
issue presented to the Court.23  The analysis in this Article will explore 
the implications of life experience when, as indicated by the research on 
appellate judges who have daughters,24 such experiences may serve as an 
 
20.  Individuals perceive the nature and implications of their experiences differently, as 
illustrated by the different approaches to specific legal issues by Justices Thurgood Marshall 
and Clarence Thomas.  Both of these African-American Justices experienced discriminatory 
treatment while growing up in the segregated societies of Maryland and Georgia, respectively.  
As described by a biographer:  
At age sixteen Thurgood Marshall began a metamorphosis.  The teasing, often goofy 
boy embarked on a journey of experiences that opened his eyes to the painful realities 
of economic and racial problems crippling most black Americans.  With high school 
behind him he had to find his place in an adult world where legal segregation and 
poverty plagued black people. 
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 40 (1988). 
Marshall’s experiences led him to argue for school desegregation and affirmative action as 
remedies for ongoing discrimination and its continuing consequences in American society.  See 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate opinion); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
Justice Clarence Thomas experienced racial discrimination growing up in Georgia in the 
1950s.  Thomas’s biographer noted, “The enforced separation of blacks and whites in Savannah 
added yet another dimension to the racial turmoil of Thomas’s early life.  Segregation appeared 
to young Clarence Thomas as a series of invisible stop signs, sharply confining where he 
traveled and whom he played with.”  KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 62 (2004).  Yet Thomas’s experiences and values led him to criticize 
reasoning in the landmark school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education as 
“rest[ing] on an assumption of black inferiority,” Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring), and oppose affirmative action as stigmatizing to African-Americans, 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
21.  Scholars who study the decision making by Supreme Court Justices have identified a 
variety of factors that affect decisions, including attitudes, precedent, persuasive interactions 
among the Justices, and Justices’ considerations of the audiences for their decisions.  
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 5–23 (2006). 
22.  Id.  
23.  See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Introduction to REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
COURT DYNAMIC 5, 5 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (“Conservative[] [justices] . . . adopt[ed] a 
formalist approach[;] they also argued for a jurisprudence based on originalism—the theory 
that the constitutional text should be seen as having a fixed meaning . . . John Paul Stevens, 
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer . . . suppor[ted] the antiformal 
approach that marked the jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger era[s] and deploy[ed] that 
approach in support of many of the same causes espoused by liberal politicians . . . .”). 
24.  See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
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influence that trumps other factors, even for Justices who claim strict 
obedience to a particular approach to constitutional interpretation, 
judicial role, or judicial values.25   
Given the potential for human experience to influence Supreme 
Court decisions, an intriguing question to consider is the impact of a lack 
of relevant life experiences on Supreme Court decisions,26 especially in 
cases for which a single vote going in a different direction might have had 
a dramatic impact on law and policy.27  Linda Greenhouse has noted, for 
example, that certain Supreme Court Justices’ lack of occupational 
experience outside of government service may influence their decisions 
about employment law as they do not understand workplace realities 
affecting non-lawyers in the private sector.28  Thus the existence of 
relevant life experiences—or the lack thereof—may have profound 
impacts, including effects on the Justices’ capacity to anticipate 
consequences of the Court’s decisions29 as well as considerations that 
 
25.  See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 18, at A14.  
In a 2003 Supreme Court opinion, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist suddenly 
turned into a feminist, denouncing “stereotypes about women’s domestic roles.” 
Justice Ginsburg said the chief justice’s “life experience” had played a part in the 
shift.  One of his daughters was a recently divorced mother with a demanding job. 
. . . . 
It turns out that judges with daughters are more likely to vote in favor of women’s 
rights than ones with only sons. 
Id. 
26.  See Linda Greenhouse, Sotomayor: Does Biography Matter, Justices on the Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, (July 24, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/justices-on-
the-job/ [https://perma.cc/J3EL-MF9S]. 
 As far as I can tell from his résumé, Samuel Alito, since his graduation from law 
school, has never cashed a paycheck that wasn’t issued by the federal 
government. . . . In federal employment, salaries are set by law and lines of authority 
are clear to all.  But in the private sector, where I’ve spent my career, salaries are 
often close to state secrets and it can be the least powerful of many bosses who can 
make an employee’s daily life the most miserable.   
Does Justice Alito understand this?  Can he?  It’s not really that complicated. So 
maybe this is the real mismatch: the wrong man for the job. 
Id. 
27.  See id.  Greenhouse’s example of Justice Alito’s lack of experience with private 
employers concerned his majority opinion in the 5-to-4 decision concerning employment and 
pay discrimination in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
28.  Id. 
29.  See Walter Isaacson, A Justice Reflects, DAILY BEAST, (June 29, 2009, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/06/29/a-justice-reflects.html [https://perma.cc/TNF
8-QCML] (interview in which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor discussed the impact of her 
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could inform presidents’ decisions about which individuals to choose for 
nomination to the Supreme Court and other federal courts.30 
II. HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor openly acknowledged the impact and 
importance of life experiences on her judicial decision making.31  She said 
in an interview: 
We’re all creatures of our upbringing.  We bring whatever we 
are as people to a job like the Supreme Court.  We have our life 
experiences.  For example, for me it was growing up on a remote 
ranch in the West.  If something broke, you’d have to fix it 
yourself.  The solution didn’t always have to look beautiful, but it 
had to work.  So that made me a little more pragmatic than some 
other justices.  I liked to find solutions that would work. 
. . . . 
It’s important for the Supreme Court to have a broader set of 
life experiences than just people who have served as judges.32 
O’Connor also emphasized the central benefit of life experience and 
personal understanding in decision making by the Supreme Court: “[Y]ou 
do have to have an understanding of how some rule you make will apply 
to people in the real world.  I think that there should be an awareness of 
the real-world consequences of the principles of the law you apply.”33 
With respect to several Justices, the connections between life 
experiences and judicial decision making seem evident.34  For example, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s outspokenness on issues of racial 
discrimination was presumably directly connected to his own experiences 
growing up as an African-American in a racially segregated and 
thoroughly discriminatory society.35  In another example, William O. 
Douglas, who grew up in impoverished circumstances in Washington 
 
practical life experiences on her judicial decisions). 
30.  For example, President Obama appeared to include consideration of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor’s life experiences and personal understanding of society in nominating her to the 
Supreme Court in 2009.  See Lani Guinier, Biography Has Always Mattered, N.Y. TIMES: 
ROOM FOR DEBATE, (May 26, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
05/26/obamas-first-choice-for-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/MM6R-3EWK]. 
31.  Isaacson, supra note 29.  
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  See supra note 20. 
35.  Id.  
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State, openly described his skepticism of police based on his personal 
observations of their treatment of poor people: “[The police] caused a 
close sifting of loyalties in a young man who felt the roughness of their 
hand.  I knew their victims too intimately to align myself with the 
police.”36  This human experience, and the skepticism about police that it 
produced, may help to explain the fact that Douglas had the highest level 
of support for constitutional rights claims in the criminal justice process 
among all Justices who have served since 1946.37  For other Justices, 
however, the impact of life experiences is less obvious and sometimes 
surprising.38   
A. The Liberalizing Impact of Life Experiences: John Paul Stevens 
The retirement of U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in 
201039 called increasing attention to the previously little-known 
connections between his life experiences and his decision making as an 
Associate Justice.40  For example, until the end of his career on the 
Supreme Court, few people knew that Stevens had provided pro bono 
representation for convicted offenders in Illinois during the 1950s.41  
Among the cases that Stevens handled as a volunteer attorney was one in 
which he gained the release of a wrongfully convicted man who had 
served seventeen years in prison for murder despite his innocence.42  The 
man’s conviction was based on a false confession after being tortured by 
the Chicago police during an interrogation session.43  In speeches decades 
 
36.  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN 78 (1974). 
37.  Douglas supported individuals’ rights claims in 86.5% of cases classified as “Criminal 
Procedure” in the Supreme Court Judicial Database.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 561, 564. 
38.  See infra Part II. 
39.  Robert Barnes, Justice Stevens to Step Down, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/AR2010040902312.html [h
ttps://perma.cc/XFW6-ZM8D].  
40.  See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 205, 213–14 (2010) (describing Justice Stevens’s World War II 
experiences that affected his views on capital punishment). 
41.  John Paul Stevens, Judicial Activism: Ensuring the Powers and Freedoms Conceived 
by the Framers for Today’s World, Address at the Third Annual John Paul Stevens Award 
Dinner (Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Stevens, Judicial Activism], in 16 CHI. B. ASS’N REC, Oct. 
2002, at 25.  Justice Stevens provided his own description of his experience in his 
autobiographical post-retirement book structured as a discussion of the five Chief Justices that 
he had known.  See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 78–80 
(2011). 
42.  People v. LaFrana, 122 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1954). 
43.  The La Frana court stated: 
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later, Justice Stevens made it clear that the abusive treatment and unjust 
imprisonment were indelibly etched into his memory.44  He said, “I 
learned that some of those interrogations [by Chicago police] did, in fact, 
involve brutal and indefensible police conduct,”45 and “What I learned 
from that case has no doubt had an impact on my work on the Supreme 
Court.”46  This experience and personal knowledge, as well as his 
exposure to similar issues considered by the Supreme Court during the 
1947 Term in which he clerked for Justice Wiley Rutledge,47 contributed 
to Stevens’s eventual role as one of the Court’s staunchest defenders of 
Miranda warnings.48 
Justice Stevens came to the Supreme Court with a public reputation 
as a Republican who grew up in a wealthy family49 and whose legal career 
was typically summarized as “a lawyer . . . specializing in antitrust 
cases.”50  Justice Stevens wrote two exceptionally strong dissenting 
opinions supporting constitutional rights for prisoners within his first 
 
According to defendant’s testimony, when he refused to confess the captain hit him 
repeatedly with his fists and with a night stick.  His hands were then handcuffed 
behind him and he was blindfolded.  A rope was put in between the handcuffs and he 
was suspended from a door with his hands behind him and his feet almost off the floor.  
While he was hanging from the door, he was repeatedly struck until he lapsed into 
unconsciousness.  When he lost consciousness he was taken down from the door and 
when he regained consciousness he would be hung back up on the door and again 
questioned and struck.  After about fifteen minutes of this treatment he agreed to sign 
a confession.  He was taken downstairs to the captain’s office where he signed a 
confession. 
Id. at 585. 
44.  John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2005); 
Stevens, Judicial Activism, supra note 41. 
45.  Stevens, Judicial Activism, supra note 41, at 25. 
46.  Stevens, supra note 44, at 270. 
47.  During the Supreme Court’s 1947 Term, Stevens researched legal issues for Justice 
Rutledge as the Court decided several cases concerning teenagers who confessed to crimes 
after being questioned in isolation.  In each case, the isolated circumstances of the 
interrogation, the vulnerability and ignorance of the young defendants, the lack of 
representation by counsel, and the risk of coercion led Justice Rutledge to join the Justices who 
challenged the voluntariness of those confessions.  See Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); 
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947). 
48.  Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 
60 DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 102–03 (2010). 
49.  Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17 TEMP. POL. 
& C.R. L. REV. 83, 86–88 (2007). 
50.  Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST 
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC, supra note 23, at 157, 157. 
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twelve months on the Court.51  Thus it may have appeared perplexing and 
difficult to explain why a “moderate”52 Republican appointee would 
immediately assert himself as the foremost advocate of prisoners’ rights53 
on a Court that still included consistently liberal Warren Court-era 
holdovers William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.54  While Justice 
Stevens’s emphasis on the concept of “liberty” in his judicial philosophy55 
explains his opinions, in part so too does the later discovery that he had 
gone into high-security prisons to interview prisoner-clients as part of his 
pro bono work for the Chicago Bar Association program.56  Stevens 
personally observed prison conditions prior to the reforms that judges 
pushed prisons to implement in the 1970s and thereafter,57 and moreover, 
he may have been the only Justice in recent history to obtain an intimate, 
personal glimpse of conditions behind the walls of prisons.58  As 
illustrated by the example of Justice Stevens, as with other Justices whose 
decisions in specific cases may run counter to initial predictions about the 
application of their judicial values,59 the impact of life experiences can be 
 
51.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108–09 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Meachum 
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52.  Robert D. McFadden, The President’s Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1975, at 1.   
53.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97–98, 108–09.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens arguably cast him as 
the most liberal Justice on prisoners’ rights because he was the lone dissenter against a majority 
opinion written by Thurgood Marshall that expanded prisoners’ right to medical care, yet 
Stevens alone among the Justices concluded that the Marshall opinion did not provide enough 
protection for incarcerated offenders. 
54.  The aggregate liberal voting records of Justices Brennan and Marshall place them 
among the Justices who were most frequently supportive of constitutional rights claims 
presented before the Supreme Court.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 561–62. 
55.  At the end of his career, Justice Stevens discussed at length his emphasis on the 
concept of liberty and its relationship to the Due Process Clause.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 863–82 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56.  STEVENS, supra note 41, at 78–79.   
57.  MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 13–17 (1998); STEVENS, supra note 41, at 78–79. 
58.  Interview by Christopher E. Smith with Justice John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice 
(ret.), U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. (July 29, 2010) (on file with author). 
59.  Justice Harry Blackmun was an appointee of Republican President Richard Nixon.  
He is most famous for writing the controversial majority opinion that effectively legalized 
abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Prior to the legalization of abortion, one of 
Blackmun’s daughters had become pregnant as a teenage college student and felt forced to 
enter into what was ultimately a short-lived marriage.  LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 74–75 (2005).  
According to Linda Greenhouse, as a result of his daughter’s experience, “Blackmun was 
painfully familiar with the consequences of unintended pregnancy.”  Id. at 74.  This aspect of 
Blackmun’s life experience was not revealed until 2004, more than twenty years after the Roe 
decision and five years after the Justice’s death.  Cynthia L. Cooper, Daughter of Justice 
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difficult to assess because of limited knowledge about each Justice’s 
experiences.60  Information may not be available, if it ever is, until 
biographers examine the Justices closely at the end of their careers61 or 
the Justices reveal information about themselves in their own 
autobiographies.62 
B. Intriguing Questions About the Impact of Life Experiences: Justice 
Antonin Scalia 
Justice Antonin Scalia was well-known as a self-proclaimed 
“textualist”63 who claimed fidelity to interpreting the Constitution 
according to its original meaning64 as well as advocated for an approach 
to statutory interpretation that disregards consideration of legislative 
history.65  While his constitutional theory led to a rights-protective 
interpretation of rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
 
Blackmun Goes Public About Roe, WOMEN’S ENEWS.ORG, (Feb. 29, 2004), 
http://womensenews.org/story/the-nation/040229/daughter-justice-blackmun-goes-public-abou
t-roe#.Uh_4rNIsn3E [https://perma.cc/6RCK-WMGJ]. 
60.  In public speeches, Stevens dropped limited hints about his life experiences and their 
impact on his judicial decision making.  See Stevens, Judicial Activism, supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  However, the extent of his influential life experiences related to the 
criminal justice system did not begin to be revealed until a journalist wrote an article about 
Stevens’s family and childhood just a few years before his retirement from a 35-year career on 
the Supreme Court.  See Charles Lane, Heartbreak Hotel, CHI. MAG., Aug. 2006, at 132–35, 
194–96, 207. 
61.  For example, the first biography of Justice Stevens was published in 2010, the year he 
retired from the Supreme Court.  BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL 
STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2010); Barnes, supra note 39, at A1. 
62.  Justice Stevens’s memoir was published in 2011, the year after he retired from the 
Supreme Court.  STEVENS, supra note 41; Barnes, supra note 39, at A1. 
63.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The 
text is the law and it is the text that must be observed.”); id. at 23–24 (“I am not a strict 
constructionist, and no one ought to be—though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. . . .  
But a proper textualist, which is to say my kind of textualist, would surely have voted to 
acquit.”). 
64.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Foreword to ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
DEBATE, 43 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (“Twenty years ago, when I joined the Supreme 
Court, I was the only originalist among its numbers.”).  
65.  Id. at 29–37. 
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Clause66 and certain Fourth Amendment contexts,67 he generally took a 
narrow view of rights in the context of criminal justice.68 
Despite his claims of fidelity to originalism, Scalia did not consistently 
apply that approach when interpreting the Constitution.69  For example, 
his influential majority opinion in Wilson v. Seiter70 made it significantly 
more difficult for incarcerated offenders to claim that prison conditions 
violate the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual 
punishments.71  Yet, Scalia relied on manipulative characterizations of 
precedents rather than originalism.72  Indeed, Scalia reportedly 
strengthened his commitment to actually applying originalism more 
frequently in criminal justice cases only after being persuaded by Justice 
Thomas’s example during Thomas’s first term on the Court in 1991–
1992.73   
In theory, Scalia’s claimed adherence to originalism as guiding his 
approach to constitutional interpretation should override any temptation 
to emphasize consideration of human consequences as the primary driver 
of judicial decisions.74  Yet Justice Scalia has also referenced his 
 
66.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Coy v. Iowa, 487 
U.S. 1012 (1988). 
67.  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
68.  See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi M. McCall, Antonin Scalia: Outspoken & 
Influential Originalist, in THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169, 169 
(Christopher E. Smith, Christina DeJong & Michael A. McCall eds., 2011) (“In criminal justice 
cases, Justice Scalia’s voting record indicated that he usually opposed the claims of individuals 
and, instead, favored the interests of police, prosecutors, and corrections officials. . . . Among 
the Rehnquist Court justices, only Justice Thomas was less likely to support the claims of 
individuals.”). 
69.  For example, as noted by Frank B. Cross, even in Scalia’s Second Amendment gun 
rights opinion, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which “has been lauded as 
the epitome of contemporary originalism at the Supreme Court[,] . . . Scalia provides in the 
opinion a laundry list of gun regulations that would be constitutional, but he provides zero 
originalist basis for these conclusions.”  FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF 
ORIGINALISM 103–04 (2013) (citation omitted). 
70.  501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
71.  Betsy M. Santini, Comment, The Curtailment of Prisoners’ Ability to Protect Their 
Right to Be Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Post-Wilson Circuit Survey of Prison 
Conditions Cases, 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 441 (1993). 
72.  Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic 
Impact on Prisoners’ Rights, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 73, 84–87 (2001). 
73.  JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 115–20 (2007). 
74.  Justice Scalia said of his fundamental approach to constitutional interpretation, 
“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original 
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understanding of human experience in ways that seem to indicate a 
potential influence on his thinking separate from his claimed fidelity to 
originalism.75  For example, a group of retired generals asked Scalia to 
recuse himself from cases concerning the rights of war-on-terrorism 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after Scalia made a public 
comment about his U.S. Army officer son’s service in Iraq.76  In 
responding to an audience member’s question following a speech he gave 
in Switzerland, Scalia said: “I had a son on that battlefield and they were 
shooting at my son, and I’m not about to give this man who was captured 
in a war a full jury trial.  I mean it’s crazy.”77  Another example is Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion against the Court’s approval in County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin78 of a flexible time period before holding a probable cause 
hearing for arrestees.  He presented sympathetically the story of a student 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, a place where Scalia previously lived and 
worked as a law professor,79 who was arrested for refusing to pay a cover 
charge after entering a restaurant.80  Another example is found in a Court 
memo from Scalia to his colleagues that was found in Justice Marshall’s 
papers in the Library of Congress.  Scalia declared that he considered 
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system to be “ineradicable.”81  
Scalia’s deference to the realities of human behavior may have fed Justice 
 
meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”  Scalia, supra note 63, at 38.  
This is not to say that Scalia never refers to human experiences and consequences in the service 
of originalism.  For example, he presented several reasons that he believed that handguns are 
contemporary Americans’ preferred weapons for self-defense in their homes when he wrote 
his originalist opinion establishing a personal Second Amendment right to gun ownership in 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
75.  See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 431 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Scalia expressed concern about criminals going free and causing further victimization as a result 
of the Supreme Court’s decision mandating increased scrutiny of peremptory challenges in jury 
selection that may be based on the potential juror’s race. 
76.  JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF 
ANTONIN SCALIA 322–23 (2009). 
77.  Tim Dillon, Report: Scalia Calls Europe ‘Hypocritical’ on Gitmo, USA TODAY, (Mar. 
26, 2006, 6:16 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-03-26-scalia-
guantanamo_x.htm [https://perma.cc/6CHR-SX42]. 
78.  500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
79.  10 Things You Didn’t Know About Antonin Scalia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 
2, 2007, 11:39 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2007/10/02/10-things-you-
didnt-know-about-justice-antonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/5HA5-NPHD]. 
80.  McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 70–71. 
81.  Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from 
the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 
1038 (1994). 
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Steven’s disappointment that his colleagues appeared to conclude that 
there was no reason to prohibit racial bias and thereby threaten the 
existence of capital punishment.82  
The arrest of Scalia’s adult daughter on DUI charges illuminates one 
particular aspect of Scalia’s personal knowledge from life experience.83  It 
presents intriguing possibilities for contributing to one of Scalia’s rights-
protective decisions, as well as raising a question about how this particular 
event, if it had gone differently, might have affected his decision about 
another case.84  On February 12, 2007, Ann Banaszewski, the then-45-
year-old daughter of Justice Scalia, was arrested by Wheaton, Illinois, 
police after officers responded to a report that a female driver with 
children in her vehicle appeared to be driving while under the influence 
of alcohol.85  The police took the children to the home of a family friend86 
while Ms. Banaszewki went through the arrest process at the police 
station on charges of DUI and child endangerment before being released 
on a recognizance bond.87  Three months later, she entered a guilty plea 
to the drunken driving charge in exchange for prosecutors dropping four 
other charges, including endangering the life of a child and failing to 
secure a child younger than eight in a child-restraint system.88  Ms. 
Banaszewki was sentenced to 18 months of court-supervised probation, 
140 hours of community service, and counseling sessions in addition to an 
automatic 6-month driver’s license suspension for refusing to take a 
breath test when stopped by the police.89  At the time of her arrest, the 
deputy police chief acknowledged that the police were well aware that 
she was Justice Scalia’s daughter.90  The deputy chief also noted that “the 
 
82.  Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia’s Influence on Criminal 
Justice, 34 TOL. L. REV. 535, 549 (2003). 
83.  Associated Press, Supreme Court Justice Scalia’s Daughter Pleads Guilty to Drunken 
Driving, FOX NEWS (May 31, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/05/31/supreme-court-
justice-scalia-daughter-pleads-guilty-to-drunken-driving/ [https://perma.cc/XG8N-A7FC]. 
84.  Angela Rozas, Daughter of Supreme Court Justice Accused of DUI, CHI. TRIB. 
(Metro N.), Feb. 14, 2007, at 3, http://www.yourbbsucks.com/forum/showthread.php?14546-
Scalia-s-Daughter-Arrested-For-DUI-And-Child-Endangerment [https://perma.cc/8ABA-HP
9Y].   
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Dennis Powell, Scalia’s Daughter Arrested, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2007), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2007/02/scalias_daughte.html [https://perma.cc/WQX2
-7BS9]. 
88.  Associated Press, supra note 83. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Rozas, supra note 84.  
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department’s police officers routinely patrol Banaszewski’s 
neighborhood to ensure her safety, a courtesy the department extends for 
others associated with law enforcement, the court system or anyone who 
requests extra patrols.”91 
Did Scalia’s experience of having a close family member arrested and 
convicted of DUI have any influence over his vote in Missouri v. 
McNeely?92  It is impossible to know the answer to that question, but it is 
intriguing to consider the possibility.93  In McNeely, a driver stopped by 
police for speeding and weaving across the centerline exhibited bloodshot 
eyes and slurred speech and also smelled of alcohol on his breath.94  The 
driver declined to submit to a breath test and, when transported to a 
hospital, refused to consent to a blood test.95  An officer instructed a lab 
technician at the hospital to draw a blood sample without the driver’s 
consent and the results of the test indicated that the driver’s blood alcohol 
level was 0.154%, well above the legal limit of 0.08%.96 
The case came to the Supreme Court as a Fourth Amendment issue 
that was described in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s majority opinion in these 
terms: “The question presented here is whether the natural 
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency 
that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.”97  
Sotomayor’s opinion rejected the per se exigency rule sought by Missouri 
and declared that “exigency in this context must be determined case by 
case based on the totality of the circumstances.”98  In other words, lacking 
the consent of the driver, police officers must obtain a warrant, if possible, 
before imposing an involuntary blood test on a suspected drunk driver.99 
 
91.  Id. 
92.  133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
93.  As illuminated by Linda Greenhouse’s comments on the impact of life experiences, 
any attribution of a causal link between life experiences and specific Justices’ decisions is 
necessarily speculative, see supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text, unless a Justice points to 
the experience himself or herself as an influential event, see supra notes 39–46. 
94.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556. 
95.  Id. at 1557. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 1556. 
98.  Id. 
99.  See, e.g., id. at 1565 (“But the general importance of the government’s interest [in 
gathering available evidence about drunk driving suspects] in this area does not justify 
departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make 
securing a warrant impractical in a particular case.”). 
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An interesting aspect of the decision is that Scalia joined with the 
Court’s most liberal, rights-protective Justices, Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, in endorsing Sotomayor’s entire majority 
opinion rather than joining the alternative opinions by his usual 
conservative allies in constitutional decisions.100  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part.101  Chief Justice John 
Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined 
by Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito,102 while Scalia’s fellow self-
proclaimed originalist, Justice Clarence Thomas,103 wrote a dissenting 
opinion.104 
Similar to the suspect in McNeely,105 Justice Scalia’s daughter refused 
to submit to a breath test for blood alcohol content.106  Based on that 
event, might Scalia have envisioned that, if his daughter had been stopped 
in any municipality other than her hometown where the police knew that 
she was the daughter of a U.S. Supreme Court Justice,107 she could have 
been involuntarily subjected to what Sotomayor’s opinion described as: 
“[A] compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely’s skin and into his 
veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal 
investigation.  Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an 
individual’s “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.”108 
Although it is impossible to know if or how his daughter’s experience 
may have influenced his thinking about the human consequences of the 
issue facing the Court in McNeely, Scalia’s unusual alignment with the 
 
100.  See Thomas B. Edsall, Supreme Injustice: Justice Thomas Is Asserting a Distinct and 
Cohesive Vision, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/opinion/edsal
l-supreme-injustice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TZ3H-NJHN] (discussing the polarized voting 
alignments in key cases of “[t]he five very conservative justices who served on the [C]ourt from 
2000 to 2013—including four still on the bench, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas . . . [and] [t]he six moderate liberals—including four still on the [C]ourt, 
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor”). 
101.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
102.  Id. at 1569–74 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
103.  See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent, 82 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (1996) 
(“Thomas . . . seeks to restore the democratic equilibrium that, in his view, the Constitution’s 
Framers intended.  Thus Thomas’ adherence to the text and original intent of the Constitution 
seeks to limit governmental power . . . .”). 
104.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1574–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
105.  Id. at 1557. 
106.  Associated Press, supra note 83. 
107.  Rozas, supra note 84. 
108.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558. 
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most liberal Justices in the decision raises the possibility of an impact 
from this very specific life experience. 
Justice Scalia’s experience with his daughter’s arrest also raises 
intriguing questions about how he might have approached and 
understood the human consequences of Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders109 if his daughter had been booked into the jail, as happens to 
many drunk-driving suspects,110 instead of merely being processed and 
released111 from an affluent suburb’s police station.112  In Florence, a man 
was arrested based on a bench warrant that was erroneously maintained 
in a court database despite the fact that he had already paid the fine on 
which the warrant was originally based.113  In the seven days that it took 
for the mistake to be recognized, he was held in one jail for six days and 
then transferred for one day to a second jail.114  Upon entering both jails, 
he was subjected to strip searches and body cavity inspections.115  As 
described in the Court’s opinion, “[p]etitioner alleges he was required to 
lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of 
the process.”116  He filed a lawsuit against the jail authorities on the claim 
that such intrusive strip searches should only be applied when there is 
reasonable suspicion, based on the particular detainee or the nature and 
seriousness of the alleged offense, that the detainee may be concealing 
weapons or contraband under his clothing or within his body cavities.117  
Many such lawsuits have been successfully pursued throughout the 
country in the past,118 but in a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected 
the petitioner’s argument and ruled that security concerns can justify strip 
 
109.  132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
110.  See, e.g., Joe Guillen et al., Detroit Councilman Found Slumped in Car, Arrested, 
DET. FREE PRESS, July 1, 2014, at 1A (reporting member of Detroit City Council held 
overnight in jail after arrested on drunk-driving charge). 
111.  Powell, supra note 87. 
112.  The median household income for Wheaton, Illinois, in 2014 was $85,234, while the 
average for the State of Illinois was only $56,210.  The median home value in Wheaton was 
$314,918 compared to $169,600 for the rest of Illinois.  Wheaton, Illinois, CITY-DATA.COM, 
http://www.city-data.com/city/Wheaton-Illinois.html [https://perma.cc/VRM2-7VFM] (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
113.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  See id. at 1515. 
118.  Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 73–75 (2008). 
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searches for all jail detainees without any requirement of individualized 
suspicion.119 
Justice Scalia endorsed Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.120  Would 
he have done so if his daughter had been required to strip off her clothes, 
squat and cough, and endure visual examinations of her body cavities?  It 
is one thing to talk in a general way about the application of intrusive 
search practices to generic jail detainees, but perhaps quite another to 
have knowledge of, and a potential visceral reaction to, the heavy-handed 
treatment of a loved one by officials in the criminal justice system.121  If 
Scalia’s daughter had been arrested while visiting New Jersey, the setting 
for the Florence case, instead of in her Illinois suburb where she was 
known as the daughter of a Supreme Court Justice,122 her experience 
might have been quite different.123  This example creates a classic “what 
if?” scenario for which a change of circumstances might have changed one 
Justice’s knowledge and vote and thereby turned the law in a completely 
different direction.124 
C. Impervious to Life Experience Influence?: Justice Clarence Thomas 
Justice Clarence Thomas is a self-proclaimed originalist125 who 
believes that using the Constitution’s original intent for decision making 
 
119.  See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1521–23. 
120.  Id. at 1513. 
121.  See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, What I Learned About Stop-and-Frisk From 
Watching My Black Son, ATLANTIC, (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archi
ve/2014/04/what-i-learned-about-stop-and-frisk-from-watching-my-black-son/359962/ [https://
perma.cc/D7XL-MTPC] (documenting a father’s description of lessons learned and his 
reaction to his son’s improper treatment by police). 
122.  Rozas, supra note 84. 
123.  The Supreme Court’s opinion described uniform, mandatory strip search policies at 
the jails in New Jersey where the Florence petitioner was held.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.  
Under the Illinois statute, Justice Scalia’s daughter should have been protected from a jail strip 
search unless officers had a reasonable belief that the arrestee was hiding contraband.  Juan 
Perez, Jr., & David Heinzmann, LaSalle Settles Strip-Search Suits, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 2014, at 
7, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-08/news/chi-lasalle-county-strip-inmate-settleme
nt-20140408_1_lasalle-county-dana-holmes-strip-searches [https://perma.cc/35C3-3T3F]. 
124.  For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the due process-based 
challenge to Georgia’s anti-sodomy law, Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion implied that 
his decisive fifth vote to uphold the statute might have gone in favor of the individual claimant 
if the claimant had been subjected to criminal punishment under the law or if the claimant’s 
attorneys had challenged the statute under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.  Id. at 197–98 (Powell, J., concurring). 
125.  Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at A19, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122445985683948619 [https://perma.cc/BYG6-CXXL]. 
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prevents judges from imposing their own values into judicial decisions.126  
As with Justice Scalia,127 Thomas’s claimed approach to constitutional 
interpretation theoretically implies a rejection of any role for human 
experience because the focus is solely on “try[ing] to discern as best we 
can what the framers intended.”128  Indeed, Thomas has written opinions 
that have drawn criticisms from commentators as especially cruel129 and 
mean130 for lacking any empathic understanding of human consequences 
and practical implications.131  A New York Times editorial labeled 
Thomas as the “Youngest, Cruelest Justice”132 for his first-term dissenting 
opinion133 that argued there was no basis for any constitutional claim 
when corrections officers beat a shackled prisoner who reportedly 
suffered facial bruises, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate.134  A 
later opinion labeled as “one of the meanest Supreme Court decisions 
ever”135 concerned a majority opinion that tossed out a multi-million 
dollar jury verdict favoring a former death row inmate who spent 
eighteen years behind bars after being wrongly convicted due to 
prosecutors’ misconduct in hiding evidence that supported his claims of 
innocence.136   
Ironically, during his confirmation hearings, Thomas had claimed that 
he would bring to the Supreme Court an empathic understanding of the 
lives of people drawn into the criminal justice system.137  Thomas said 
 
126.  Smith, supra note 103, at 50. 
127.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
128.  Thomas, supra note 125, at A19. 
129.  Editorial, The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/27/opinion/the-youngest-cruelest-justice.html [https://perma.
cc/F6L7-HX53]. 
130.  Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the Meanest 
Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE.COM (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual
.html [https://perma.cc/63VW-B8RN]. 
131.  See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 129, at A24 (“A second disappointment concerns 
hope.  Justice Thomas rose from poverty and discrimination in Pin Point, Ga., and his 
nomination won support from prominent people sure he would bring to the Court the 
understanding bred of hardship.”); Lithwick, supra note 130 (“Both Thomas and Scalia have 
produced what can only be described as a master class in human apathy.  Their disregard for 
the facts of Thompson’s thrashed life and near-death emerges as a moral flat line.”). 
132.  Editorial, supra note 129, at A24. 
133.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
134.  Id. at 4, 18. 
135.  Lithwick, supra note 130. 
136.  Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). 
137.  Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
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during his testimony: 
And I believe Senator, that I can make a contribution, that I 
can bring something different to the Court, that I can walk in the 
shoes of the people who are affected by what the Court does.  
You know, on my current court [the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit] I have occasion to look out the 
window that faces C Street, and there are converted buses that 
bring in the criminal defendants to our criminal justice system, 
busload after busload.  And you look out, and you say to yourself, 
and I say to myself every day, “But for the grace of God, there go 
I.”   
So you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as those 
individuals.  So I can walk in their shoes, and I can bring something 
different to the Court.138 
However, in his role as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas typically claims 
that his sole concern is the fulfillment of the Framers’ original 
intentions.139 
Despite Thomas’s claimed aspirations to focus solely on original 
intent,140 he can reveal cognizance of human consequences for certain 
contexts and issues, such as opposition to race-based affirmative action,141 
about which he apparently has strong personal feelings.142  For example, 
Justice Thomas is famous for his silence during the Court’s oral 
arguments, with the close of the 2013–2014 Term marking eight years 
since he last asked a question of counsel during arguments.143  Thus he 
 
of the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 102d 
Cong. 260 (1993) (testimony of J. Clarence Thomas, United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit). 
138.  Id. 
139.  See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
140.  See supra notes 125–28. 
141.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them 
to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”). 
142.  ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 268 (2001) 
(“The downside to racial preferences, he reasoned, remained what it always had been: the 
presumption that minorities were intellectually inferior.  This tradeoff had grated on him since 
Yale; now he ripped into these ‘obnoxious assumptions’ openly.  ‘My friends, I will not concede 
my intellectual inferiority or my son’s for socio-economic gain. . . . For me, this concession has 
been, and will always be, too great a price to pay.’”). 
143.  Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas’s Disgraceful Silence, NEW YORKER (Feb. 21, 
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2014/02/clarence-thomas-disgraceful
-silence.html [https://perma.cc/W7DG-SX9F]. 
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surprised his colleagues and observers at the Court in December 2002 
when he suddenly interjected144 with evident personal feeling145 during an 
argument about the criminalization of cross-burning.146  Justice Thomas, 
who knew the threat of white racists’ violence from his youth in the 
segregated South of the 1950s,147 spoke about cross-burning as “unlike 
any symbol in our society”148 because “[t]here’s no other purpose to the 
cross, no communication, no particular message . . . .  It was intended to 
cause fear and to terrorize a population.”149  In another example of an 
issue for which Thomas focused on human consequences, he wrote an 
opinion discussing how “[g]angs fill the daily lives of many of our poorest 
and most vulnerable citizens with terror . . . , often relegating them to the 
status of prisoners in their own homes.”150  These concerns were 
consistent with those of political conservatives who often prefer to focus 
on the harms to crime victims rather than the rights of criminal 
defendants.151  However, it deviated from his claimed focus on originalism 
to include consideration of human consequences as part of the 
justification for a judicial decision.152 
In light of the examples when Justice Thomas focused on human 
experience,153 there are intriguing “what if” questions that emerge 
 
144.  See Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A1 (“Justice Thomas speaks in a rich baritone that is all the more 
striking for being heard only rarely during the court’s argument sessions. His intervention, 
consequently, was as unexpected as the passion with which he expressed his view.”). 
145.  Id.  
146.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
147.  See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON 21–22 (2007) (“In the fifties 
and sixties, blacks steered clear of many parts of Savannah, which clung fiercely to racial 
segregation for as long as it could.  The Ku Klux Klan held a convention there in 1960, and 250 
of its white-robed members paraded down the city’s main street one Saturday afternoon.  No 
matter how curious you might be about the way white people lived, you didn’t go where you 
didn’t belong.  That was a recipe for jail, or worse.”). 
148.  See Greenhouse, supra note 144, A1.  
149.  Id. 
150.  City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 98–99 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
151.  See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice 
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931, 996–
97 (2005) (“To many, nothing about his criminal jurisprudence shows any empathy for 
criminals.  As noted above, however, a core principle of black conservative thought on crime is 
its advocacy for the severe punishment of criminals and the protection of victims.  This is 
especially true of poor black victims whom black conservatives view as being prisoners in their 
own homes due to the rapidly deteriorating conditions of their streets and neighborhoods.”). 
152.  See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
153.  See supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text. 
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because Thomas’s nephew, Mark Martin, is serving a thirty-year sentence 
for drug trafficking in a federal prison.154  Although this family 
relationship creates the possibility of personal knowledge about 
inhumane treatment of prisoners, Thomas’s originalist interpretations 
have made him consistently oppose the recognition of federal 
constitutional rights for prisoners.155   
Thomas’s opinions are very deferential to the claims of prison officials 
about the need to limit prisoners’ rights in order to maintain institutional 
safety and security.156  During his first decade on the Supreme Court, 
Thomas’s originalist approach emphasized that the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights did not intend for the Eighth Amendment to be applied to the 
treatment and living conditions experienced by convicted offenders in 
prison.157  For example, according to Thomas, 
[s]urely prison was not a more congenial place in the early 
years of the Republic than it is today; nor were our judges and 
commentators so naive as to be unaware of the often harsh 
conditions of prison life.  Rather, they simply did not conceive of 
the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh 
treatment.158 
Thomas’s position was criticized on historical grounds159 because prisons 
did not develop as institutions for long-term incarceration until the 
nineteenth century.160  Therefore, there is no basis for saying what the 
authors of the Bill of Rights believed about an institution that did not 
exist at the time of the original amendments’ drafting and ratification.161  
 
154.  Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Justice’s Family Ties Are a Tangle of Race, 
Poverty and Privilege, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2007, at A1. 
155.  Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. 
L. REV. 853, 866–69 (2011). 
156.  For example, Justice Thomas wrote an opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, arguing 
prison officials’ expressed concerns about safety and security justified racial and ethnic 
segregation in the cells of California’s prison processing center.  The other Justices, who applied 
standard equal protection analysis, demanded that prison officials actually demonstrate a 
compelling justification and not merely assert claims about safety.  Johnson v. California, 543 
U.S. 499 (2005). 
157.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
158.  Id. 
159.  Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 24 (1997). 
160.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
77–82 (1993). 
161.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE 
THOMAS: CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 92 (2000) (“In light 
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Later, Thomas acknowledged that prisons did not exist as established 
institutions for punishment in the founding era, and therefore he shifted 
to a new originalist approach to deny the existence of rights for 
prisoners.162  According to Thomas’s revised approach, states’ laws 
control what rights, if any, are granted to incarcerated offenders in state 
prisons.163  In Thomas’s words, “[w]hether a sentence encompasses the 
extinction of a constitutional right enjoyed by free persons turns on state 
law, for it is a State’s prerogative to determine how it will punish 
violations of its law, and this Court awards great deference to such 
determinations.”164  In the case of the federal prison system where his 
nephew is incarcerated, Thomas presumably applies the same deferential 
stance that minimizes the existence of prisoners’ rights in favor of policy 
choices by Congress and officials in the U.S. Bureau of Prisons.165 
The interesting question to consider is whether issues of prisoners’ 
rights would have become sufficiently concrete and personal to trigger 
Thomas’s consideration of human experience if his nephew suffered 
specific harms as a result of mistreatment by corrections officials.166  What 
if Thomas’s nephew was beaten by corrections officers while shackled and 
suffered facial injuries and damaged teeth,167 the situation in Hudson v. 
 
of the history of punishment in early America, Thomas misstates the framers’ view on prison 
conditions in the sense that the framers could not have had view on prisons—an institution that 
was yet to develop.”). 
162.  Christopher E. Smith, Rights Behind Bars: The Distinctive Viewpoint of Justice 
Clarence Thomas, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 829, 846–50 (2011). 
163.  Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139–40 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
164.  Id. at 140. 
165.  While Justice Thomas has endorsed the existence of statutes that permit prisoners 
to file lawsuits for intentional torts committed by federal prison officials, Millbrook v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013), he has resisted the identification of constitutional rights for 
federal prisoners, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 861 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment) (“Given my serious doubts concerning the correctness of Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97 (1976),] in extending the Eighth Amendment to cover challenges to conditions of 
confinement, I believe the scope of the Estelle ‘right’ should be confined as narrowly as 
possible.”), other than acknowledging that all incarcerated offenders have a due process right 
of access to the courts that entitles them to mail letters and petitions to judges, see Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 381–82 (1996) (“I agree that the Constitution affords prisoners what can 
be termed a right of access to the courts.  That right, rooted in the Due Process Clause and the 
principle articulated in Ex parte Hull, [312 U.S. 546 (1941),] is a right not to be arbitrarily 
prevented from lodging a claimed violation of a federal right in a federal court.”). 
166.  Smith, supra note 162, at 869–71. 
167.  Justice Thomas was reportedly outraged when a different nephew, a college student, 
was punched and tasered by hospital security officers in Louisiana after refusing to put on a 
hospital gown when he sought treatment at the emergency room, Huma Khan, Judge Clarence 
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McMillian168 for which Thomas rejected a recognition of a rights 
violation169 seven years before the nephew was sentenced to prison in 
1999?  What if Thomas’s nephew had been chained shirtless to a post for 
seven hours in a prison yard without access to toilet facilities or adequate 
drinking water, as in Hope v. Pelzer?170  In this case, Thomas dissented171 
against a declaration that denied officers’ qualified immunity because, in 
the majority’s view, such actions clearly violate the Eighth 
Amendment.172  What if Thomas’s nephew had been among the dozens 
of prisoners who fell ill in 2014 and caused a Michigan prison to be 
quarantined “after maggots were discovered along a prison meal line—
inches from serving trays”?173  The example of the cross-burning case 
seemed to indicate that personal knowledge could lead Thomas to 
incorporate considerations of human experience into the analysis of a 
case.174  However, it is completely unknown whether Thomas has similar 
personal knowledge about prisoners’ rights issues through his nephew’s 
experience,175 let alone whether any such victimization of his nephew 
 
Thomas’ Nephew Derek Tasered by Hospital Staff, Family Says, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2010), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2010/07/judge-clarence-thomas-nephew-derek-tasered-by-h
ospital-staff-family-says.html [https://perma.cc/KDE5-357D], but there has never been any 
indication that his imprisoned nephew has faced such treatment, even though other 
incarcerated offenders have been victimized by improper physical mistreatment, see, e.g., 
Michael Vasquez & Julie K. Brown, Miami-Dade Warden Tied to Shower Death of Inmate Is 
Suspended, MIAMI HERALD (July 10, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/commu
nity/miami-dade/article1974934.html [https://perma.cc/3NTE-MUPY] (reporting that a 
mentally ill Florida prisoner died after being locked in a small shower by corrections officers 
and then sprayed with scalding hot water for two hours). 
168.  503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
169.  Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
170.  536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
171.  Id. at 748–64 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
172.  According to Justice Stevens’s majority opinion, “[a]s the facts are alleged by Hope, 
the Eighth Amendment violation is obvious,” id. at 738, and “Hope . . . was treated in a way 
antithetical to human dignity—he was hitched to a post for an extended period of time in a 
position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both degrading and dangerous,” 
id. at 745. 
173.  Paul Egan, Partial Quarantine Ordered at Prison in Jackson as 150 Inmates Fall Ill, 
DET. FREE PRESS (July 3, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140703190505/http://www.free
p.com/article/20140703/NEWS06/307030121/prison-food-aramark-maggots-quarantine [https:/
/perma.cc/AA2R-TGUS].   
174.  See supra notes 144–51 and accompanying text. 
175.  Justice Thomas presumably has had some contact with his imprisoned nephew 
because Thomas and his wife raised the nephew’s son, Merida & Fletcher, supra note 154, at 
A1.  However, the nephew is incarcerated in the federal prison system, which has a reputation 
for having better living conditions than those in many state prisons, Jayne O’Donnell, State 
Time or Federal Prison?, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2004), at 3B, 
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would alter Thomas’s well-established and consistent hostility to the 
recognition of prisoners’ rights.176 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is clear evidence that Supreme Court Justices can be affected 
by personal experiences and their understanding of the human 
consequences of judicial decisions.177  This is true even for those Justices 
who claim to follow conscientiously a particular theory of constitutional 
interpretation that purports to be divorced from outcome-based 
considerations about human consequences.178  Although the foregoing 
discussion focuses on cases concerning the protection of rights in the 
criminal justice system, human experience can—but will not 
necessarily179—also lead to strong crime-control viewpoints advocating a 
need for limited rights in criminal justice.180  This may be reflected in 
 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/2004-03-18-statetime_x.htm [https://perma.
cc/DNH7-MGH7], he may not have experienced the kinds of shocking treatment that, if 
conveyed to his uncle, might affect Justice Thomas’s personal understanding of and reaction to 
the human consequences of prison, see, e.g., Vasquez & Brown, supra note 167 (providing 
examples of prisoners in Florida state prisons dying after being subjected to scalding water and 
tear gas). 
176.  Christopher E. Smith, Brown v. Plata, The Roberts Court, and the Future of 
Conservative Perspectives on Rights Behind Bars, 46 AKRON L. REV. 519, 530–34 (2013). 
177.  See supra notes 31–33, 39–44 and accompanying text. 
178.  See supra notes 144–51 and accompanying text. 
179.  Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter were all known to 
have been robbery victims.  Aliyah Shahid, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s Home 
Robbed Again, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 18, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics
/supreme-court-justice-stephen-breyer-home-robbed-article-1.1080713 [http://perma.cc/SRE9-
RRQB].  Yet all of them were on the rights-supportive liberal side of the spectrum in their 
voting records regarding constitutional rights claims in criminal justice cases.  EPSTEIN ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 561–63. 
180.  See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 577–81 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
The prisoner release program carried out a few years earlier in Philadelphia is 
illustrative.  In the early 1990’s, federal courts enforced a cap on the number of 
inmates in the Philadelphia prison system, and thousands of inmates were set free.  
Although efforts were made to release only those prisoners who were least likely to 
commit violent crimes, that attempt was spectacularly unsuccessful.  During an 18-
month period, the Philadelphia police rearrested thousands of these prisoners for 
committing 9,732 new crimes.  Those defendants were charged with 79 murders, 90 
rapes, 1,113 assaults, 959 robberies, 701 burglaries, and 2,748 thefts, not to mention 
thousands of drug offenses. 
. . . . 
The prisoner release ordered in this case is unprecedented, improvident, and 
contrary to the PLRA.  In largely sustaining the decision below, the majority is 
gambling with the safety of the people of California.  Before putting public safety at 
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former prosecutor Justice Samuel Alito’s concerns about the potential for 
a drastic increase in violent crime when offender and detainee 
populations are reduced at correctional facilities.181  In addition, human 
experience obviously has the potential to affect Supreme Court Justices’ 
decisions for other kinds of issues.182   
As indicated by the examples of Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas 
described in this Article, there is reason to expect that human experience 
could play a pivotal role in Supreme Court decisions, especially in close 
cases for which the vote of a single Justice may determine the outcome 
for a divided Court.183  As one scholar has noted, “Try as they might to 
claim judicial independence, Justices are still the products of where they 
came from and who they were before going onto the bench.”184  Thus, 
although President Barack Obama endured harsh criticism in 2009185 for 
 
risk, every reasonable precaution should be taken.  The decision below should be 
reversed, and the case should be remanded for this to be done. 
I fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim 
roster of victims.  I hope that I am wrong. 
Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  For example, commentary on the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), concerning the Affordable Care Act’s 
mandate for employers to cover contraceptives as part of medical insurance plan, focused on 
the religious divide among the Justices and speculated about the role of Christianity or 
Catholicism in the life experiences of the five Justices in the majority as compared to the three 
Jewish Justices who were among the four dissenters, Samuel G. Freedman, Among Justices, 
Considering a Divide Not of Gender or Politics, but of Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2014, at 
A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/us/supreme-court-decisions-in-a-catholic-jewish-
context.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PMY3-VB8Y].  As Linda Greenhouse noted, the five 
Justices in the majority had “brushed past the complaint raised by the two non-Christian 
plaintiffs” in an earlier case challenging the imposition of Christian prayers at city council 
meetings, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), yet these five Justices displayed 
“extreme solicitude” to the “religious beliefs of Hobby Lobb[y] [stores’] Evangelical Christian 
owners.”  Linda Greenhouse, Reading Hobby Lobby in Context, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/linda-greenhouse-reading-hobby-lobby-in-contex
t.html [https://perma.cc/WQ5B-CT6H]. 
183.  It is possible to speculate, for example, that Justice Stevens’s experiences as a pro 
bono attorney who gained the release of a wrongly-convicted offender in the early 1950s who 
had been physically abused by Chicago police to force his false confession, see supra notes 39–
46 and accompanying text, played a role early in his Supreme Court career when he cast the 
decisive fifth vote to identify rights violations in the case of a man who murdered a young child 
and was then questioned by police outside of the presence of his attorney, Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
184.  Freedman, supra note 182, at A13. 
185.  See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Beware of Empathy, FORBES (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/04/supreme-court-justice-opinions-columnists-epstein.html [ht
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indicating that he wanted to appoint a Justice with an empathic 
understanding of the human contexts and consequences of judicial 
decisions,186 such an approach realistically considers an important 
element that can influence case outcomes.187  There are risks of unrealistic 
assumptions about judicial decision making when we pretend that we 
“want robed robots”188 who claim to follow only precedents or a 
particular theory of constitutional interpretation, notwithstanding strong 
evidence that personal values and human experience play a significant 
role in judicial decision making.189  In particular, we may end up with 
judicial officers whose experiences and understanding of society are so 
narrow that they cannot realistically understand the contexts of the cases 
presented to them and the likely consequences of their decisions.190  As 
illustrated by the hypothetical question, “What if Justice Scalia’s daughter 
had been stripped searched and endured a body cavity inspection as part 
of her arrest for drunken driving?,”191 a Justice’s knowledge—or lack 
thereof—of actual human consequences, including those that are 
psychologically humiliating192 or physically harmful,193 could determine 
the outcomes in close cases that affect the lives of millions of people.194  
 
tps://perma.cc/SR7X-WQ8F] (“[I]ntellectually there is, I think, no worse way to go about the 
selection process.  Empathy matters in running business, charities and churches.  But judges 
perform different functions.  They interpret laws and resolve disputes.”). 
186.  Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, In Search for New Justice, Empathy, or at Least 
‘Empathy,’ Is Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/
politics/26memo.html [https://perma.cc/6AL8-GY8C]. 
187.  See supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text. 
188.  Freedman, supra note 182, at A13. 
189.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Behavior of Supreme Court Justices When Their 
Behavior Counts the Most, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone_-_Behavior_of_Justices.pdf [https://perma.cc/3
WWB-HAGG] (indicating that those Justices who claim to follow judicial restraint or 
originalism do not actually do so in major cases for which they advance their preferred 
outcomes, notwithstanding claimed commitments to a particular theory). 
190.  See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
191.  See supra notes 83–91, 106–21 and accompanying text. 
192.  See, e.g., Perez & Heinzmann, supra note 123, at 7 (“Jail surveillance video shows 
three male guards and a female guard carrying Holmes into a cell, stripping off her clothes and 
leaving her naked.”). 
193.  See, e.g., Grace Schneider, 4 Sue, Cite Stripping at Jail, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., 
June 13, 2014, at A3 (“Walker also reported seeing another man undergo stripping by officers 
who pulled the man’s feet from under him so that he landed headfirst on the floor and knocked 
out teeth, the suit says.”). 
194.  The case that authorized jail strip search policies covering even arrestees about 
whom there is no suspicion of carrying weapons or contraband hidden in their bodies, Florence 
v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), was decided by a 5-to-4 vote with Justice 
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This should be reason enough to consider individuals’ life experiences 
and awareness of court decisions’ societal impacts when evaluating 
judicial nominees. 
 
Scalia’s vote among the decisive votes in the majority.  The decision has broad potential impact 
on the privacy and bodily integrity of numerous Americans because, for example, the FBI 
reported that 12.2 million arrests were made in 2012.  UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS (Fall 2013), 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arre
sted/arrestmain.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ3F-6UFP]. 
